HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF EVIL:
A DEONTOLOGICAL STRATEGY
Justin Mooney

One paradigmatic argument from evil against theism claims that (1) if God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil. But (2) there is gratuitous evil, so (3) God
does not exist. I consider three deontological strategies for resisting this argument. Each strategy restructures existing theodicies which deny (2) so that
they instead deny (1). The first two strategies are problematic on their own,
but their primary weaknesses vanish when they are combined to form the
third strategy, resulting in a promising new approach to the problem of evil.

1. The Argument from Gratuitous Evil
Arguments from evil against theism come in many varieties, but one paradigmatic argument from evil goes as follows:
(1) If God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil.
(2) There is gratuitous evil. So,
(3) God does not exist.1
By “God,” I mean a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally
perfect. By “evil” I mean any non-instrumentally bad states of affairs. As
for the term “gratuitous,” I want this to capture the two main ways some
philosophers think that an evil might be impermissible for God. So I will
stipulate that an evil is gratuitous if and only if it is either (i) not tied to
a good that outweighs it, or (ii) impermissible regardless of whether it is
tied to a good that outweighs it.2
When I speak of an evil being tied to a good, what I mean is that the
good can be brought about only by permitting either that evil, or some
evil equally bad or worse. Being tied to a good is an agent-relative matter.
For example, there might be a good G that nomically necessitates an evil
E. Then, relative to any ordinary human agent, E is tied to G. But since
1
The argument from gratuitous evil is due to Rowe, “The Problem of Evil.” I’ve based this
formulation on DePoe, “Epistemological Framework.”
2
The first disjunct of this definition is fairly standard, and reflects that of Rowe, “The
Problem of Evil.”
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God has power over the laws of nature, God can bring about G without
permitting E. So although E is tied to G for human agents, it is not tied to
G for God. But if we imagine instead that G entails E, then E will be tied to
G even for God.3
When I say that a good outweighs an evil, what I mean is that a state of
affairs which includes both the good and the evil is better, ceteris paribus,
than one which lacks both. It doesn’t matter whether the overall value of
the state of affairs that includes both the good and the evil is a function
of the respective values of the good and the evil when each is taken on its
own, or if their combination is instead a Moorean organic unity.4
There are two ways for an evil to be gratuitous by my definition. The
first is by not being tied to an outweighing good. Call evils which satisfy
this condition conditionally gratuitous. Since being tied to an outweighing
good is an agent-relative affair, an evil may be conditionally gratuitous for
some agents and not others. The second way for an evil to be gratuitous is
for that evil to be impermissible regardless of whether it is tied to an outweighing good. An evil E satisfies this condition iff E is (i) impermissible,
and (ii) the facts in virtue of which E is impermissible can obtain with or
without E being tied to any outweighing goods. Call evils that satisfy this
condition unconditionally gratuitous. Below we will see that unconditional
gratuitousness can be agent-relative in a certain sense as well. Notice that
these two types of gratuitousness are not mutually exclusive. An evil
which is not tied to an outweighing good might also be impermissible
independently of this fact.5
I think it is safe to say that most opponents of the argument resist
premise (2). But I will join that minority who resist (1), and the even
smaller minority who resist (1) on deontological grounds.6 Though controversial, deontology is a well-established family of theories that does at
least as good a job of capturing some of our important ethical intuitions as
its major rivals. So, it is an independently motivated foundation on which
to build a response to the problem of evil. Moreover, we will see that a
3
An evil E will also be tied to G for God if G entails, not E per se, but that God permits E
(Crummett, “Sufferer-Centered Theodicies”).
4
This is a standard account of what it is for an evil to be outweighed. The notion of an
organic unity was introduced by Moore, Principia Ethica, and the idea that God “defeats”
evils by incorporating them into highly valuable organic unities is developed by Chisholm,
“Good and Evil”; Adams, Horrendous Evils; and McCann, Creation.
5
Reitan, “Consequentialist Morality,” documents that most discussion in the literature
has focused on what I am calling conditionally gratuitous evil. For discussion of what I am
calling unconditionally gratuitous evil, see, e.g., McNaughton, “The Problem of Evil” and “Is
God (Almost) a Consequentialist?”; Mooney, “A Deontological Problem”; Murray, Nature Red
in Tooth and Claw, ch. 6; cf. Sterba, “Skeptical Theism.”
6
That is, by drawing on notions that are traditionally associated with deontology. I take
no stand on whether they should further be regarded as exclusively or definitively deontological. Both the general point that one’s ethical theory may impact how one presents or
responds to the problem of evil, and the more specific point that deontology does so, have
been made before. Pierce, “Moderate Deontology,” even suggests using a Rossian framework.
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deontological approach to theodicy does not need to begin from scratch,
because it allows us to restructure existing theodicies that challenge (2) so
that they instead target (1).7
In what follows, I consider the prospects of three deontological strategies for rejecting (1). I will argue that the first two are problematic on their
own, but that their primary weaknesses vanish when the strategies are
combined to form a third strategy. The result is a promising new approach
that theists can pursue in their efforts to solve the problem of evil. But to
be clear, my aim is not to solve the problem of evil in a single paper; it is
only to outline a plausible strategy for doing so.
2. The Deontological Framework
Before considering the three deontological strategies, let me lay out the
ethical tools I will be using. Since it will be convenient to use a certain deontological theory, I will presuppose Markosian’s “Rossian Minimalism.”8
On Rossian Minimalism, an agent’s all-things-considered obligations
emerge from the interaction of Rossian prima facie duties. The defining
thesis of this view, as Markosian states it, is: “An act is morally right if and
only if it minimizes prima facie duty violations by its agent.”9 I want to
make two small adjustments to this formulation. First, like certain other
philosophers, I prefer the term “pro tanto” to “prima facie” in this context.10 Second, I take it that Markosian thinks the rightness of an act does
not merely track facts about pro tanto duties, but also obtains in virtue
of facts about pro tanto duties. So, I will modify Markosian’s statement
of the view to read “An act is morally right if and only if and because it
minimizes pro tanto duty violations by its agent.”11
I will also embrace the traditionally deontological assumption that
there are sometimes discrepancies between which actions an agent may
or ought to perform, on the one hand, and which actions would have the
best consequences, on the other hand. Following Scheffler, we can sort
these discrepancies into two categories.12
First, there are what Scheffler calls agent-centered restrictions.13 These are
“restrictions on action which have the effect of denying that there is any
non-agent-relative principle for ranking overall states of affairs from best
to worst such that it is always permissible to produce the best available
7
Reitan, “A Deontological Theodicy,” has made this point about what I will call the restriction strategy below.
8
Markosian, “Rossian Minimalism.”
9
Markosian, “Rossian Minimalism,” 7.
10
Ross, The Right and the Good, himself used the term “prima facie duty,” but expressed
dissatisfaction with it.
11
I owe the useful locution “if and only if and because” to Joshua Spencer.
12
Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism.
13
I will take no stand in this paper on exactly how Scheffler’s agent-centered restrictions
and prerogatives relate to similar notions discussed by other authors, e.g., Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism; and Parfit, Reasons and Persons.
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states of affairs so characterized.”14 For example, suppose you can prevent five other people from breaking promises only by breaking a similar
promise of your own. Since promise-breaking is bad, the consequences of
breaking your promise would be five times better than keeping it (ceteris
paribus). But it’s plausible that you are still not permitted to break your
promise.15
In the context of Rossian Minimalism, the closest thing to what Scheffler calls agent-centered restrictions will be certain all-things-considered
obligations that arise out of the interaction of an agent’s pro tanto duties in
a specific situation: namely, any such obligations which require an agent
to bring about less than the best state of affairs she is able to bring about
in that situation. So, for the purposes of this paper, I will simply stipulate
that agent-centered restrictions are these all-things-considered obligations. Given this stipulation and the assumption that Rossian Minimalism
is true, an agent is bound by an agent-centered restriction in a situation if
and only if and because the agent is able to minimize her pro tanto duty
violations only by bringing about a state of affairs that is less than the best
state of affairs she is able to bring about in that situation.
Second, there are what Scheffler calls agent-centered prerogatives. An
agent-centered prerogative is a moral prerogative “which has the effect of
denying that one is always required to produce the best overall state of affairs.”16 For example, one might think it is permissible to spend a holiday
bonus on entertainment instead of giving it to a good charity.
In the context of Rossian Minimalism, the closest thing to what Scheffler calls agent-centered prerogatives will be certain all-things-considered
permissions that survive the interaction of an agent’s pro tanto duties in
a specific situation: namely, any such permissions which allow an agent
to bring about less than the best state of affairs she is able to bring about
in that situation. So, I will simply stipulate that agent-centered prerogatives are these all-things-considered permissions. Given this stipulation
and the assumption that Rossian Minimalism is true, an agent enjoys an
agent-centered prerogative in a situation if and only if and because the
agent can minimize her pro tanto duty violations by bringing about a state
of affairs that is not the best state of affairs she is able (and perhaps also
permitted) to bring about in that situation.17
Different moral agents can have different agent-centered restrictions
and prerogatives with respect to the same state of affairs. For example,
suppose I have a large sum of extra money that I could give to a charity,
Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, 2–3.
Thanks to Pete Graham for this example.
16
Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, 5.
17
The editor observes that, by my definitions, having an agent-centered restriction entails
having an agent-centered prerogative, and this is a nonstandard way of thinking about prerogatives, since we ordinarily think we are free not to exercise them. Readers unhappy with
my terminology are welcome to substitute “agent-centered permission” (an alternative I owe
to Ernesto Garcia).
14
15
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and you do not. If I gave the money to a certain charity, a great deal of
suffering would be prevented. If you took the money from me without my
permission and gave it to that same charity, the same suffering would be
prevented, and I would forgive you for taking the money. So more harm
would be prevented by giving the money to charity, whether you give it
away or I do. Even so, you are not permitted to give the money away, because it is not yours to give. I think in this case you have an agent-centered
restriction against giving the money to charity, while I do not.
In what follows, it will be useful to have a name for certain kinds of
cases where different agents have different agent-centered restrictions
and prerogatives with respect to the same state of affairs. When an agent
has a prerogative to maximize value in ways that other agents are not
permitted to, let’s say that agent has a maximizing prerogative. And when
an agent has an obligation to maximize value in ways that other agents are
not permitted to, let’s say that agent has a maximizing restriction. Now let’s
put these tools to work.
3. The Restriction Strategy
The first strategy for resisting (1) is what I will call the restriction strategy.
It employs either agent-centered or maximizing restrictions to argue that
God is obligated to permit gratuitous evil. Let’s consider conditionally
gratuitous evil first.
3.1. The Restriction Strategy and Conditionally Gratuitous Evil
Just because an agent can prevent an evil without sacrificing a greater
good, that doesn’t mean she is permitted to. Arguably, agent-centered
restrictions sometimes require agents to permit conditionally gratuitous
evils, such as when one agent is not permitted to interfere with the poor
and even destructive choices of another agent.18 So, it’s conceivable that
God might face agent-centered restrictions that require God to permit evil
that is conditionally gratuitous.
Reitan defends this view.19 Moreover, he shows that one can pursue this
strategy by modifying existing theodicies that, in their standard form, attack (2). Here is my preferred way of presenting his idea. Most theodicies
consist of the conjunction of a metaphysical thesis (MT) and an axiological
thesis (AT). Where “E” names the evils that the theist is attempting to explain, and “G” names the greater good or goods which are supposed to
justify God’s permission of E, a typical theodicy claims that:
MT: For God, E is tied to G.
AT: E is outweighed by G.
Thanks to Brian Guiley, who first helped me to see this point.
Reitan, “A Deontological Theodicy.” See also Little, A Creation-Order Theodicy; Haig, “A
Deontological Solution”; Pierce, “Moderate Deontology”; and Mooney, “A Deontological
Problem?”
18
19
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The standard story is that, if both of these theses are true, then God would
be justified in permitting E. Reitan proposes to modify standard theodicies by replacing the axiological thesis with a corresponding thesis that I
will call a “restriction thesis” (“RT”):
RT: Due to an agent-centered restriction, God is obligated to bring
about G.20
By replacing the axiological thesis, AT, with the restriction thesis, RT, the
theodicist is relieved of the burden of challenging (2) and instead challenges (1).
Reitan illustrates his strategy with a “neo-Kantian” modification of
Swinburne’s theodicy of moral evil.21 Let “significant freedom” mean the
ability to freely bring about a variety of states of affairs, ranging from the
very good to the very bad; and let “the risk of moral evil” mean the state
of there being a non-trivial chance that serious moral evils will be committed. Swinburne affirms the following theses:
MT-1: For God, the risk of moral evil is tied to significant freedom.
AT-1: The risk of moral evil is outweighed by significant freedom.
Reitan documents severe criticism of AT-1, and proposes instead that God
is obligated not to systematically intervene in human affairs to prevent
humans from perpetrating horrors, even if our freedom is not worth the
cost of the horrors.22 In effect, he suggests replacing AT-1 with the following restriction thesis:
RT-1a: Due to an agent-centered restriction, God is obligated to give us
significant freedom.
In defense of this thesis, Reitan argues that a divine policy of systematically interfering in the world to prevent moral evil would violate human
dignity, comparing it to a dystopian police state that coercively removes
everyone’s ability to commit murder. So, according to Reitan, God is obligated to adopt a policy of nonintervention.
Here is a second example of my own. Let “soul-making” mean the
process of people developing virtuous moral character out of initial moral
immaturity, due in large part to their own choices. Let a “vale of suffering”
mean a realm of mixed value, including suffering like that of our own world
in intensity and frequency. With this terminology in place, we can state the
pair of theses to which the standard soul-making theodicy is committed:
MT-2: For God, a vale of suffering is tied to soul-making.
AT-2: A vale of suffering is outweighed by soul-making.
RT restates Reitan’s (2**) in terms of agent-centered restrictions.
Swinburne, Providence.
22
Reitan uses “horrors” and “horrendous evils” in the sense of Adams, Horrendous Evils.
20
21
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The traditional soul-making theodicist claims that the truth of these two
theses is sufficient to justify God’s permission of the evils in the vale of
suffering. But the restriction strategist might propose exchanging AT-2 for
this restriction thesis:
RT-2a: Due to an agent-centered restriction, God is obligated to enable
our soul-making.
There is something to be said for RT-2a. Human flourishing consists at
least partly in our moral characters being perfected. Perhaps this is one
reason why parents are obligated to train their children morally: to not
spoil them, to teach them to get along with their siblings, to teach them
good manners, etc. Maybe God has even greater responsibilities than
human parents do to promote human flourishing, with the upshot that
God is obligated to perfect the characters of fallen or morally immature
creatures, even if this means placing them in a vale of suffering. Or, instead of an obligation to perfect us, perhaps God is bound by a kind of
anti-paternalistic obligation to let us develop our characters in the direction of our own choosing, and a vale of suffering is the only environment
that will fully enable this choice.23 Either way, I think RT-2a has at least
some plausibility.24
3.2. The Restriction Strategy and Unconditionally Gratuitous Evil
Reitan’s way of pursuing the restriction strategy targets conditionally gratuitous evils. But what about unconditionally gratuitous evils? Some evils
strike us as unconditionally gratuitous.25 But what the restriction strategist
should say about them depends on whether they also seem to be conditionally gratuitous (for God).
For those that do, the restriction strategist could say that the divine
agent-centered restriction she posits is unique to God, and our intuitions
that certain evils are unconditionally gratuitous are merely tracking the
fact that they are unconditionally gratuitous for us. For example, a defender
of RT-1a could say that, while God has an agent-centered restriction to risk
certain evils for the sake of human freedom, we are not permitted to bring
about those evils for that purpose, and we wouldn’t be permitted to even
if human freedom outweighed them. A defender of RT-2a could say the

Cf. Haig, “A Deontological Solution.”
Mark Murphy points out that restriction theses like RT-2a are a bit odd in that they
seem to be forbidding God from maximizing a certain value (the good for human beings)
for the sake of promoting that very same value in a different way, and ultimately to a lesser
degree. I think we can reduce this oddness by distinguishing facets of the good for human
beings. What the restriction is doing is limiting God’s freedom to maximize our physical
and emotional good, at least for the time being, and instead requiring God to promote our
spiritual good in certain ways. This sounds less paradoxical to me, though any agent-centered restriction will inevitably have some scent of paradox about it (Scheffler, The Rejection
of Consequentialism).
25
As I argue in Mooney, “A Deontological Problem?”
23
24
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same about the evils involved in soul-making. Then the evils in question
would be unconditionally gratuitous for us but not for God.
In defense of the idea that God has unique agent-centered restrictions
not shared by any human being, the restriction strategist could remind us
that many obligations and prerogatives are role-relative, being possessed
only by those who occupy certain roles like the role of parent, police officer, or president.26 In light of this observation, it’s not outrageous to think
that there might be obligations, and indeed agent-centered restrictions,
that are possessed only by the agent that occupies the role of God of the
universe.
What about evils which strike us as unconditionally gratuitous, but are
not conditionally gratuitous—at least not for God? These evils strike us
as impermissible even though—for God and perhaps for everyone else
too—they are tied to outweighing goods. For example, one natural way to
explain the fact that Swinburne’s arguments for AT-1 in the final chapter
of his book have intuitive force, and yet his critics remain unsatisfied, is
that, although AT-1 is true, it is morally irrelevant, because at least some
of the world’s moral evils are impermissible despite being outweighed by
the good of significant freedom. Similarly, one natural way to explain why
soul-making theodicists have found AT-2 plausible, and yet their critics
have been left unsatisfied, is that, while AT-2 is true, it is morally irrelevant, because at least some of the world’s evils are impermissible despite
being outweighed by the good of soul-making.
To deal with this suggestion, the restriction strategist might propose a
different restriction thesis—one which features a maximizing restriction,
such as one of the following:
RT-1b: Due to a maximizing restriction, God is obligated to give us significant freedom.
RT-2b: Due to a maximizing restriction, God is obligated to enable our
soul-making.
I suspect that the considerations which lend RT-1a and RT-2a some plausibility also lend RT-1b and RT-2b some plausibility. If one of these theses
is true, then God will be obligated to permit evil of the sort that occurs in
our world even if we have an agent-centered restriction against permitting
it. In that case, the evils in question will be unconditionally gratuitous for
us, but not for God. Then the restriction strategist could suggest that our
intuitions that certain extant evils are unconditionally gratuitous are not
tracking the fact that they are unconditionally gratuitous full stop, but
rather the fact that they are unconditionally gratuitous for us.
3.3. Evaluating the Restriction Strategy
These sketchy remarks are no more than an outline of some ways that one
might attempt to carry out the restriction strategy. But an outline affords
26

McConnell, “Moral Dilemmas.”
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enough material to say something about its prospects. I will consider two
worries about the strategy: one which I think can be skirted without much
difficulty, and another that poses a greater challenge.
First, some philosophers will object to the notion that God has moral
obligations such as agent-centered restrictions, for it might seem inappropriate that a perfect being would be bound by external constraints,
moral or otherwise.27 But, following Reitan, I believe that everything I say
about divine obligations could be recast in terms of the natural behavior
of a morally perfect being. One could replace talk of God’s all-things-considered obligations with talk of what it is necessary that God would do,
given God’s moral character. And one could replace talk of God’s pro tanto
obligations with talk of natural inclinations to behave in certain ways.
Moreover, one could distinguish these natural inclinations from others
(e.g., love-based inclinations) by positing that they have a distinct phenomenology, or perhaps a slightly different causal role in God’s mental
life. So, although it is convenient to speak as if God has moral obligations,
the restriction strategist does not need to take a side on whether this is so.
Now for the most serious worry facing the restriction strategy. In order
for God to have agent-centered or maximizing restrictions such as those
discussed above, God’s pro tanto duties must balance out accordingly.
But, in ordinary moral experience, just as there are cases where our pro
tanto duties interact so as to generate obligations to permit gratuitous
suffering, so there are cases where our pro tanto duties interact so as to
generate an obligation to prevent gratuitous suffering. And surely, like
us, God will have pro tanto duties of both sorts: duties to intervene and
duties not to intervene. So, we have to face the question whether God’s
pro tanto duties will balance out such that a thesis along the lines of RT-1a
and its counterparts is true—i.e., such that God was obligated to permit
the world’s suffering.
Prima facie, an affirmative answer to this question is doubtful. As we
go through life, obligations to permit gratuitous evil seem to be the exception rather than the rule. True enough, sometimes our hands are tied.
But not usually—and certainly not in the case of atrocities like those recounted by Dostoevsky’s character Ivan Karamozov, as well as the other
horrors which pepper the literature on the problem of evil. Pro tanto
duties to prevent gratuitous evil often win out over pro tanto duties to
permit it, which suggests that the former are very powerful. This should
at least cast some doubt on ambitious restriction theses like RT-1a and its
counterparts, which entail that God’s hands are tied (so to speak) with
respect to all the evil, or even just all the moral evil, in the history of the
world.28

E.g., McCann, Creation.
Cf. Tooley’s argument featuring the balance of right-making and wrong-making properties in “The Problem of Evil.”
27
28
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4. The Prerogative Strategy
I turn now to a different strategy for resisting (1). Some theists have argued that a perfect being need not promote creaturely welfare, thereby
dissolving a major reason for thinking that (1) is true.29 We can cast this
idea in an explicitly deontological mold by appealing to agent-centered
prerogatives and maximizing prerogatives to argue that God has the prerogative to permit gratuitous evil. I will call this the prerogative strategy.
4.1. The Prerogative Strategy and Conditionally Gratuitous Evil
Let’s begin with how the prerogative strategist might handle conditionally
gratuitous evil. In one sense, the moral requirements that we have with
respect to conditionally gratuitous evil are not very demanding. Within
certain limits, it seems permissible for human agents to pursue their own,
non-value-maximizing projects. And contra authors such as Singer and
Unger,30 reflection on ordinary moral practice and experience suggests
that this license extends so far as to permit us to pursue our own projects
even when our resources could have instead been devoted to alleviating,
preventing, and campaigning against the world’s multifarious evils. For
example, it’s plausible that I am not obligated to give all of my available
money to famine relief or the like. Since sacrificing my personal projects
seems to be a lesser evil than the suffering I could prevent by doing so, I
suspect there is an agent-centered prerogative at work here.
The prerogative strategist could claim that, like us, God has an
agent-centered prerogative to pursue God’s own projects instead of always
preventing the world’s suffering. After all, even God will have projects
that can be pursued—e.g., certain worlds that can be created—only at the
expense of permitting conditionally gratuitous evil.31 So, if morality gives
us some wiggle room to pursue such projects, maybe it does the same for
God.32
Ultimately, whether or not God has agent-centered prerogatives similar to ours depends on what Scheffler calls “the underlying rationale”
of agent-centered prerogatives.33 If those prerogatives are morality’s way
of accommodating human limitations, then presumably God won’t have
29
Davies, The Reality of God; Murphy, God’s Own Ethics; Rea, The Hiddenness of God, ch.
5. Rea applies the idea to divine hiddenness rather than evil. The connection I draw with
Singer below is inspired especially by Rea’s comments in the Q & A that follows Lecture 3 of
his Gifford Lectures.
30
Singer, “Famine”; Unger, Living High.
31
A point which has been made, e.g., by Rea, The Hiddenness of God.
32
On the view that divine “obligations” reduce to divine inclinations, the proposal would
be that God has natural inclinations that track whatever sort of facts ground moral obligations for non-divine agents. But how can this be so in the case of agent-centered prerogatives,
for isn’t God inclined to do the best, when there is a best? One possible response here (which
I regrettably lack the space to explore) is to say that God really only performs one action: creating a possible world. Then, if there is no best possible world, there is no best action for God
to perform, so God is not inclined to do the best. (Thanks to Mark Murphy for this objection.)
33
Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism.
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them. But we cannot say that morality requires us to maximize the good
as far as we are able to, given our limitations, for I just rejected that sort
of view on the grounds that it clashes dramatically with ordinary moral
practice and moral experience. Instead, the proposal would have to be that
morality permits us to choose certain goods of lesser value over certain
goods of greater value, and that human limitations explain why we are
forced to choose between them in the first place.34
But notice that, on this version of the story, human limitations only
explain why we are sometimes forced to choose between goods; we still
lack a story about why, when we are faced with such a choice, we are
sometimes permitted to choose the lesser good, even when this means permitting gratuitous suffering. For all we have seen so far, that story might
entail that any agent that is sometimes forced to choose between goods is
also sometimes permitted to choose lesser goods over greater goods.
For example, a number of authors have defended some version of the
thought that the reason we are sometimes permitted to choose lesser
goods over greater goods, when we are confronted with such a choice,
is rooted in our personhood.35 The rough idea is that a full or natural expression of personhood requires the moral freedom to pursue personal
projects with some amount of independence from their overall moral
value, and morality secures this moral freedom for people by permitting
them to sometimes choose lesser goods. This view seems to entail that any
person who is forced to choose between greater and lesser goods may at
least sometimes choose the lesser goods. And God is one such person, for
God must choose between the alternative good possible worlds that could
be created. Indeed, Michael Rea has applied Susan Wolf’s version of this
idea to God in pursuit of what I take to be a version of the prerogative
strategy.36
34
Might the relevant human limitations be limitations of perspective or point of view,
rather than of power? (Thanks to Mark Murphy and Wally Wirchnianski for pressing me
on this issue, and to the latter for helpful discussion.) For example, Scheffler argues that we
each have a personal point of view from which we weigh our own projects more heavily than
their impersonal worth, and this is what agent-centered prerogatives accommodate. But if
Scheffler is right, I’m inclined to say that God probably has a personal point of view in the
same sense that we do. Why not suppose that God places special value on certain personal
projects unique to God’s role as creator, such as the project of creating and sustaining what I
will below call a “world that matters”? In fact, there is independent reason to think that God
values (in some sense) certain things out of proportion to their impersonal worth. For many
theists think that there is no best possible world and that therefore God will need to use a
different decision procedure when creating than one which simply aims to maximize value
from what Sheffler calls the impersonal point of view.
35
Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism; Williams, in Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism; Wolf, “Moral Saints.” Wolf is not explicit about the application to agent-centered
prerogatives, but it’s at least a natural thought to have in light of her discussion. If Wolf’s
idea is taken as a rationale for agent-centered prerogatives, it turns out to be very similar to
that of Williams.
36
One qualification here. Rea uses Wolf’s work to argue that God can permissibly and
rationally pursue projects incompatible with promoting human welfare, but it’s not clear
whether he thinks the resulting human suffering is conditionally gratuitous. (This caveat
applies to the attribution in n. 31 too.) This makes it unclear whether there is a divine

HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A DEONTOLOGICAL STRATEGY 453

One might object that God’s prerogatives need not extend to permitting
the evil in our world in order to ensure that God’s projects enjoy sufficient
independence of moral demands. But something similar holds for human
beings. I can imagine morality demanding much more charitable giving
from the affluent to prevent gratuitous evil, while still leaving ample room
to express their personhood. So, if there is a problem here, it seems to be a
general problem about agent-centered prerogatives of the sort that we have,
and not a special problem about extending those prerogatives to God.37
As with the restriction strategy, the prerogative strategy can be pursued
by restructuring traditional theodicies. For example, Swinburne contends
that God might choose to create what I will call “a world that matters.”38
Let “a world that matters” mean a world where creatures have significant
moral responsibility, because they can freely bring about states of affairs
ranging from the very good to the very bad; they can dramatically affect
how well or poorly things go in the world, both for themselves and for
others; so a great deal is at stake in their choices and lives. For reasons
that I do not have the space to pursue here, Swinburne contends that a
world that matters will be one that contains natural evil and at least the
risk of great moral evil, too.39 The core of his theodicy can be captured in
the following two theses:
MT-3: For God, natural evil and the risk of moral evil are tied to a
world that matters.
AT-3: Natural evil and the risk of moral evil are outweighed by a
world that matters.
The prerogative strategist could adapt Swinburne’s theodicy by proposing that God is justified in permitting the world’s evils, not because
they are outweighed by the value of a world that matters, but instead because God has an agent-centered prerogative to create and sustain a world
that matters. This would mean replacing the above axiological thesis with
what we can call a prerogative thesis (PT):
PT-1a: Due to an agent-centered prerogative, God is permitted to create
and sustain a world that matters.
To see that PT-1a is plausible, suppose I want there to be more life in
the universe, so I introduce primitive life on another planet, knowing that
it will evolve into creatures like us in conditions much like those here on
agent-centered prerogative involved. But either way, his proposal could certainly be taken
in that direction.
37
Thanks to a referee and the editor for comments that improved the discussion in the last
few paragraphs.
38
Swinburne, Providence. Swinburne uses this locution (or something very close to it) occasionally in his work, but he doesn’t introduce it as a technical term in the way that I have
done here.
39
For a detailed defense of this thesis, including discussion of how it squares with traditional views about the afterlife, see Swinburne’s Providence.
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Earth. I remain on that planet and somehow live long enough to witness
the evolution of moral agents there. But I don’t devote all of my time,
energy, and other resources to preventing and alleviating their suffering.
Instead, I spend some of my time pursuing other projects, like scientific
study of the biosphere that has evolved, or maintenance of its natural
beauty.
My intuition about this case is that I have not done anything impermissible. It was not impermissible for me to introduce life on the planet,
and, even though all the conditionally gratuitous suffering on that planet
is at least indirectly causally downstream of my introducing life there,
it seems to me that what is morally required of me with respect to the
suffering of other agents in that planet’s biosphere is not much different
than what is morally required of me with respect to the suffering of many
people and nonhuman animals around the world right now. Those moral
requirements leave plenty of room for pursuing non-value-maximizing
personal projects.40 But there is an analogy between this case and creating
and sustaining a world that matters. Among other similarities, in both
cases an agent initiates processes that will result in a world with the same
mix of value and disvalue as ours, and pursues projects incompatible with
preventing gratuitous suffering that occurs causally downstream of initiating those processes. I think the analogy is strong enough to show that
PT-1a is plausible.41
4.2. The Prerogative Strategy and Unconditionally Gratuitous Evil
So far I have focused on conditionally gratuitous evils. But what about
unconditionally gratuitous evils? First consider evils which strike us as
unconditionally gratuitous but are also conditionally gratuitous (for God).
Since it’s possible for an agent to have an agent-centered prerogative
40
This thought experiment is also a counterexample to Wielenberg’s principle C in his
“Intrinsic Value and Love.” Another kind of case worth thinking about is that of releasing
animals into their natural habitats.
41
As a referee points out, one disanalogy that might be important is God’s exhaustive
foreknowledge or middle knowledge which would enable God to predict each gratuitous
evil. The referee claims that, if I could predict the gratuitous evils that would result from
introducing life on the planet, then I would be obligated to prevent those evils (either by intervening or not introducing life on the planet in the first place), and the same goes for God’s
creation of a world that matters. One way to address this worry is to embrace either open
theism, on which God lacks exhaustive foreknowledge, or a stage view of foreknowledge,
where God’s foreknowledge is not able to inform God’s providential decisions (discussed,
e.g., in Hunt, “Divine Providence,” and Zimmerman, “Simple Foreknowledge”). Another
response is to deny that the disanalogy has the significance that the referee suggests. I’m
not sure that I share the referee’s intuition about this. I certainly don’t think that agents
must always avoid doing anything that they know will result in gratuitous evil that would
not happen otherwise. On the assumption that many familiar cases of suffering are gratuitous—an assumption which I think many non-theists take for granted—this principle
suffers counterexamples. Even though I’m confident that any children I might have would
experience at least some gratuitous suffering in the course of their lives, I think I can have
children. Even if I have detailed information about the specific suffering that would be prevented if I gave the entirety of my next paycheck to famine relief, I am not obligated to do
that. And so on.
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to permit an evil E while another agent does not have a prerogative to
permit E, the prerogative strategist can say that God has an agent-centered prerogative to permit those evils even when we find ourselves in
circumstances where we do not.
What about evils which strike us as unconditionally gratuitous but are
not also conditionally gratuitous (for God)? I’m inclined to think that the
reason why Swinburne’s theodicy strikes his critics as morally unsatisfying despite the fact that his arguments for AT-3 have considerable force
is because, although AT-3 is true, it is morally irrelevant. Some evils are
unconditionally gratuitous despite the fact that they are not conditionally
gratuitous (for God). In that case, the prerogative strategist can appeal to
a maximizing prerogative instead of an agent-centered prerogative. She
could propose the following thesis:
PT-1b: Due to a maximizing prerogative, God is permitted to allow the
evils that are required to create and sustain a world that matters.
If this thesis is true, then—once again—God will have the prerogative to
permit suffering of the sort that occurs in our world even if some agents in
some circumstances do not.
There is something to be said for these suggestions about how the
prerogative strategist can handle unconditionally gratuitous evil. It’s
plausible that some of the evils around the world that we could prevent if
we gave more of our income to charity, or spent more of our time fighting
for social justice, etc., are unconditionally gratuitous. And since agents
have the prerogative to pursue their own projects instead of devoting all
of their available resources to preventing and ending these evils, they
must be unconditionally gratuitous only relative to agents in certain circumstances, and not relative to everyone around the world whatsoever.
And if they are not even unconditionally gratuitous relative to all human
agents, it’s not outrageous to think that they might not be unconditionally
gratuitous for a uniquely positioned agent such as God, who alone faces
the choice between a world that matters and a world that doesn’t.
4.3. Evaluating the Prerogative Strategy
These sketchy remarks are no more than an outline of how one might attempt to carry out the prerogative strategy. But an outline affords enough
material to say something about its prospects. I will consider two worries
about the strategy: one that I think can be rebutted, and another that poses
a much greater challenge.
First, one might object that the prerogative which the prerogative strategist attributes to God is too extreme to be plausible. Surely any credible
moral theory will entail that an agent who can end massive amounts of
horrendous evil with minimal effort ought to do so. For example, if you
could end all the suffering in the world by simply pressing a button, then
you ought to do it. And you ought to do it even if it would require giving
up some personal project. But then surely God, who could prevent all
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suffering from this moment forward without even so much as pressing a
button, ought to do so, even if it means giving up some divine project.42
I think the best response to this objection is to deny that you ought
to press the button. For suppose that MT-3 is true. Then, pressing the
button would mean transforming the world from a world that matters
into a world that doesn’t matter (in the technical sense introduced above).
It would mean turning this world into a world where people don’t do
anything of great moral significance, such as a world where people spend
most of their time plugged into pleasure machines.43 When I take this feature of the case seriously, it no longer seems to me that I ought to press
the button. Granted, God could dramatically reduce, without completely
eliminating, the evil in the world.44 But if Swinburne is right, the world
can matter to greater or lesser degrees, and any significant reduction in the
world’s horrendous evil would require a similarly significant reduction in
the extent to which the world is one that matters.45 Were I in a position to
do this to our world at the press of a button, it is not obvious to me that I
ought to do so.46
I see two ways to explain my intuitions about pressing these buttons,
provided that they are correct. First, we could say that (i) a world that
matters to the degree that ours does, but also has suffering comparable to
ours, is less valuable than a world that matters much less, but has much
less suffering; (ii) nevertheless, an agent in a position to choose between
them has the agent-centered prerogative to choose worlds that matter
more. Second—and this is my preference—we could say that (i) a world
that matters as much as ours does, but also has suffering comparable to
ours, is more valuable than a world that matters much less, but has much
less suffering; and (ii) any unconditionally gratuitous evils in the former
worlds are not unconditionally gratuitous relative to an agent who is
choosing between those worlds. The agent has a maximizing prerogative
to choose a world like ours. Either of these explanations suits the prerogative strategist.
Here now is the objection that I think poses the most serious problem
for the prerogative strategy. Moral requirements to prevent gratuitous suffering are not the only reason many have thought that premise (1) is true.
It is a truism in western monotheistic traditions that God loves us. But if
God loves us, God would want to protect us from gratuitous suffering
Versions of this objection were put to me by Dan Dake and a referee.
This case is inspired by cases from McCann’s Creation and the final chapter of Swinburne’s Providence.
44
Thanks to a referee for this point.
45
See, e.g., Swinburne’s discussion of a “toy-world” in The Existence of God, 263-7.
46
If we further limit the effects of pressing the button, this intuition gets weaker and
weaker. But at the same time, our imagined situation becomes less and less like God’s—which
may suggest that we are entering territory where God has prerogatives that we don’t—and
moreover the prerogative that God would need in order to permissibly refrain from doing
the equivalent of pressing the button becomes less and less extreme.
42
43
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even if God was not obligated to. Love is a powerful motivator. Therefore,
even granting the prerogative strategist everything she wants, there is still
a powerful argument for (1).
The best place to resist this argument is to challenge the premise that,
if God loves us, then God will protect us from gratuitous suffering even
if God is not obligated to. There are different ways to do this. One could
argue that God’s love for us does not move God to protect us from gratuitous suffering because God is not able to protect us from gratuitous
suffering. But given divine omnipotence, this suggestion has not been
popular. One could instead argue that God’s love for us does not move
God to protect us from gratuitous suffering because God is not permitted
to protect us from gratuitous suffering. I think this suggestion is more
promising, and I will return to it in the next section. But for now I note
simply that it is no part of the prerogative strategy to argue that God is
not permitted to prevent gratuitous suffering; that is the burden of the
restriction strategy.
The typical response from prerogative strategists is that God’s love
does not move God to protect us from gratuitous suffering because of the
ways divine love differs from human love, either in its nature or in how
it is manifested. But although defenses of this thesis by prerogative strategists are impressive, they are bound to leave some unsatisfied.47 After
all, it seems seriously conceptually strained to suggest that a being who
permits people to suffer gratuitously and horrendously over long periods
of time loves those people in any sense even distantly analogous to our
notion of love. Rea ultimately falls back on skeptical theism to handle this
strain, but I won’t follow him there, as I am aiming for a theodicy.48 So, the
prerogative strategy could benefit from a better response to this objection.
5. The Restriction-Prerogative Strategy
We’ve now seen two strategies for resisting premise (1): the restriction
strategy and the prerogative strategy. In this section I propose a third
strategy for resisting (1) which combines the restriction and prerogative strategies, and I argue that combining these strategies dissolves the
primary problem that each faces when taken on its own. I will call this
combined strategy the restriction-prerogative strategy.
The restriction and prerogative strategies are compatible: it could be
the case both that God is not obligated to prevent the gratuitous suffering
in the world, as the prerogative strategy claims, and that God is obligated
not to prevent that suffering, as the restriction strategy claims. So, to take
a concrete example, suppose that a world that matters does not outweigh
its suffering, and so the suffering it contains is conditionally gratuitous for
God. To account for this evil, the Restriction-prerogative strategist might
endorse this prerogative thesis PT-1a from the previous section, and one
47
48

Wielenberg, “Intrinsic Value.”
Rea, The Hiddenness of God, 88–89.
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or both of the restriction theses RT-1a and RT-2a. Roughly, the idea is that
God has the (agent-centered) prerogative to create a world that matters,
but there are still restrictions on how God can run that world.
Alternatively, the restriction-prerogative strategist might think, as I do,
that the value of a world that matters does outweigh the evil it contains,
so if there is anything right about dissatisfaction with theodicies like
Swinburne’s, it stems from the fact that some of the evil in a world that
matters strikes us as unconditionally gratuitous. In that case, she might
adopt a prerogative thesis such as PT-1b, and combine this with a restriction thesis such as one (or both) of the maximizing restriction theses RT-1b
and RT-2b. Once again, the rough idea is that God has a prerogative to
create a world with gratuitous evil, but there are restrictions on how God
can run it. As I will now argue, this simple move of combining the two
strategies dissolves the most pressing problem for each.
Recall that the problem for the restriction strategy was that, even if God
is sometimes obligated to permit gratuitous suffering, it’s likely that the
pro tanto duties of non-intervention which undergird those obligations
are often overridden by pro tanto duties to intervene, such that God is obligated to prevent more of the world’s suffering than has been prevented.
And the problem with the prerogative strategy was that, even if God is
not required to prevent our suffering, God would do so anyway because
God loves us. But I will now argue that, if God has the prerogative to
permit the world’s suffering, then it is plausible that God’s pro tanto duties of nonintervention stand undefeated after all. Hence the problem for
the restriction strategy is solved. And if those pro tanto obligations stand
undefeated, then, however much God loves us, God cannot prevent our
suffering because God is not permitted to.49 Hence the problem for the
prerogative strategy is also solved.
The key to both solutions is the thesis that, given a divine prerogative
to permit the world’s suffering, God’s pro tanto obligations to permit that
suffering stand undefeated. I will defend this claim by returning to an earlier observation: reflection on commonsense morality and ordinary moral
practice suggests that human beings are not required to devote all of their
extraneous resources to preventing and alleviating the multifarious evils
around the world. We have the prerogative to devote a great deal of our
resources to pursuing leisure activities, the arts, business endeavors, and
so on, even when we could instead be actively pursuing social justice,
volunteering at soup kitchens, and donating more to famine relief, cancer
research, crime prevention, etc. Let’s explore this point for a moment.
Many of the evils which we could prevent or alleviate with our extraneous resources are probably either conditionally gratuitous for us or
unconditionally gratuitous for at least some agents in some circumstances.
49
I take it this has always been the restriction strategist’s explanation for why God’s love
does not move God to protect us from suffering. E.g., see Reitan’s closing flourish, “God can
only weep and wait” in his “A Deontological Theodicy.”
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So, the fact that we are not required to use all of our extraneous resources
in this way must be due to agent-centered and/or maximizing prerogatives to permit gratuitous suffering. Suppose that I have a pro tanto duty
to prevent certain gratuitous suffering, as well as the prerogative not to
prevent it. Then I must also have a pro tanto duty that I can fulfill (or fulfill
to a greater degree) only if I do not prevent that suffering. For suppose I
didn’t. Then my choice is between (i) fulfilling the pro tanto obligation to
prevent the suffering plus whatever other pro tanto duties I may have, or
(ii) fulfilling only the latter. In that case, I can minimize my pro tanto duty
violations only by preventing the suffering. So, on Rossian Minimalism, I
am obligated to prevent the suffering. And if I am obligated to prevent the
suffering, then I do not have the prerogative to permit it.
Therefore, any agent who has a prerogative not to prevent certain
gratuitous suffering cannot also have a pro tanto duty to prevent that
suffering unless she has some contrary pro tanto duty as well to balance
it out. But in many cases where we have a prerogative not to prevent suffering (like when we have a prerogative not to give to famine relief), it
is doubtful that we have such contrary pro tanto obligations. For when
we are not obligated to prevent gratuitous suffering that we are able to
prevent, we are often permitted to engage in morally unimportant projects
and leisure activities instead. In many such cases, it is plausible that the
only reasons I have not to prevent suffering are whatever reasons I have
to pursue those projects or leisure activities. And surely those reasons do
not have the moral weight of pro tanto obligations—much less pro tanto
obligations that would intuitively balance out a pro tanto obligation to
prevent gratuitous suffering.
This suggests that the reason we have a prerogative not to devote all of
our available resources to preventing the world’s evils is not that, although
we have a pro tanto duty to do so, that duty is counterbalanced by other
pro tanto duties. Rather, the reason is that we have no pro tanto duty to
use our resources that way in the first place.
We can test this proposal by considering cases where it is plausible
that agents are not required to prevent gratuitous suffering that they are
able to prevent: e.g., supererogatory levels of charitable giving, volunteer
work, pursuit of social justice, etc. If I’m right that agents often do not have
even a pro tanto obligation to do these things, then it should be easy to
generate an all-things-considered obligation not to prevent the suffering in
these cases by simply adding a relatively unimportant contrary pro tanto
obligation to the case, for then I could minimize my pro tanto duty violations only by not preventing the suffering.
And it turns out, we are able to do precisely that. For example, however
much I may want to give my latest paycheck to famine relief, I think I am
obligated not to if I have solemnly promised it to a friend to help her start
a business. Or however much I want to work in a soup kitchen today,
perhaps motivated by a love of humanity, I ought not to if it would make
me two hours late to work (and I have not gotten permission to be late,
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etc.). And so on. This seems to confirm that, although we have reasons to
prevent gratuitous suffering that we are not obligated to prevent, nevertheless, we do not have even a pro tanto obligation to prevent it.
The prerogative strategist should say the same about God. God has
the prerogative to allow the suffering that has occurred in the history of
the world, not because God has pro tanto obligations to prevent that suffering that are counterbalanced by other pro tanto obligations, but rather
because God has no pro tanto obligations to prevent that suffering in the
first place.
And now it is clear that the pro tanto duties posited by the restriction
strategist will stand undefeated. For if indeed God has no pro tanto duties
to prevent the suffering in the history of the world, and God has pro tanto
duties to permit that suffering, then God can minimize God’s pro tanto
duty violations only by permitting the world’s suffering. By permitting
that suffering, God can satisfy both the restriction strategy’s pro tanto duties, and any other pro tanto duties God has. Whereas, by preventing the
world’s suffering, God satisfies at most only the latter.
Since God’s pro tanto duties to permit suffering carry the day, the
problem for the restriction strategy is solved. And since this means that
God is obligated to permit the world’s suffering, the prerogative strategist’s
problem is solved, too. For however much God’s love may motivate God
to prevent the suffering that befalls us, God cannot do so, because God is
obligated not to. So, it looks as though we can solve the problems facing
the restriction and prerogative strategies by simply combining them.
I offer the Restriction-Prerogative strategy for resisting the argument
that opened the article: leave (2) alone, and target (1) instead. But don’t do
this by pursuing either the restriction strategy by itself, or the prerogative
strategy by itself. Instead, combine them. For while each strategy by itself
is unpromising, by employing them together, the theist may be able to
solve the problem of evil.50
University of Massachusetts Amherst
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